The War on Drugs, Counter-Terrorism
The War on Drugs and Harms
Objectives and Motivation
Objectives
Notwithstanding individual discrepancies between narcotic trafficking groups and terrorist groups in terms of motivating factors, objectives and regional circumstances in which they operate, some generalisations regarding the two entities can be made. One fundamental factor, which also merits the existing legal discrepancy between organised criminal activity and terrorism, is the difference in motivation.
Although controversy exists over definitions, especially about terrorism it can be agreed that terrorism is a form of political violence where the political aspect of motivation is a significant factor in classifying an organisation as terrorist. On the other hand, for actors in organised crime the driving force is mainly economic gain.
Due to their differences in motivation, narco-terrorist organisations on different ends of the crime-terror continuum can be argued to constitute quite different types of security threats about magnitude of attack, choice of target and weapons. The motivation of an organisation to a certain extent also dictates for whom or what it poses a threat.
The state is a case in point. So far as mainly economically motivated organisations are a threat to the state this primarily concerns the control of parts of the state, such as the judicial branch, law enforcement agencies, as opposed to actively challenging the state.
Politically motivated organisations on the other hand, wish not only to control parts of the state and society, but they also wish to reform or revolutionise the state and societal structures to fit their ideological conviction
The variety of objectives in organisations along the crime-terror continuum and between narcotics groups and terrorists could also restrain, if not the possibility, then the extent of cooperation between them.
Motivation
Consider an ethnic separatist group with a Marxist-Leninist ideological foundation such as the Kurdish PKK, or an essentially religiously based group such as al-Qaeda.
Their objective, although vastly different in character, is to change society and the state, to a state-run economy or a society based on strict religious laws and codes.
They want to rebuild the state in the image that fits their sense of the proper order and organisation. In contrast, drug traffickers and producers want to exist within the state structure with minimum state intervention in the economy In a more sinister vein, their activities benefit greatly from societal disarray and minimal government control over land and population
Even though an organisation’s position on the crime-terror continuum can alter over time, knowledge of where on the crime-terror continuum an organisations is located at present can provide important information of the motives behind an organisation’s actions or vice versa.
Politically motivated acts for example, will probably target sites connected with the status quo power, which the organisation opposes, such as targets of symbolic power, political institutions or leaders. The choice of targets can thus indicate the underlying motivational orientation of an organisation.
In August 1999, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) made a raid into Kyrgyzstan from their base in Tajikistan. The attack generated social unrest and bewilderment but also resulted in the forceful abduction of twenty people.
According to reports the IMU gained US$2 million in ransom for these hostages, considerably increasing the financial capital of the organisation.
The raid itself however can also be argued to have been an investment protection mission. Before the attacks, Kyrgyzstan had, with moderate success, managed to supervise one of the main trafficking routes used in the 1990s, the highway from Khorog in Tajikistan to Osh in Kyrgyzstan, along which IMU bases in Tajikistan are located. Following the incursions, narcotic trafficking attempts were reported to have increased threefold.
#Experts agree that the IMU is heavily involved in narcotic trafficking in the region and that the organisation might at one point have controlled as much as 70% of opiates entering Kyrgyzstan .
It could be argued that the terrorist attacks in 1999 were carried out to protect their investment, implying that the insurgency had a primary economic, not political, motivation.
The differences in motivational forces between organisations along the continuum largely govern modes of operation, choice of targets and potential recruitment pools.
Consequently, this generates significant differences between narco-terrorist organisations and points to the disparity among organisations along the crime-terror continuum.
Different Levels of Security
The policy of anti-drugs and anti-terrorism as separate issues occupy different levels of security, which traditionally has had an effect on the attention given to the respective issues.
When it occurs, terrorism, and international terrorism particularly, constitute a threat to national and international security. It is, especially today, top of the agenda at many international and regional conferences or organisational meetings.
In contrast, according to the conventional perspective on the drug issue, it affects human security. Effects of the drug trade such as the spread of HIV/AIDS and other transmittable diseases such as Hepatitis C creates immense suffering for the infected and also imposes huge costs on society in terms of health care, medical treatment and lost productivity, yet the drug threat has not until recently and, only in some instances, been regarded as national security threat.
“Fighting Drug Trafficking Equals Fighting Terrorism”
Regardless of whether the two wars share a common front or if they occupy different flanks, one war seems to take precedence over the other and further diverting resources.
The war on drugs has gained much attention in recent years, yet this can be argued to be mainly due to its established connection with the war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11.
Dissimilarities Of Policy
This viewpoint originates in a focus on the effects of drug abuse in the consumer societies. Yet in sharp contrast to this perspective, much of policy implementations in the war on drugs have been directed at the supply side. Millions of dollars have been spent on eradication, infiltration of drug cartels and interdiction.
Even though the problem of narcotics could be presented as a national and even international security threat, especially considering the implications of narco-states and the possibility of regional instability originating from such states as well as growing numbers of drug abusers in consumer, as well as in production and transit countries, it remained through the twentieth century an issue for low politics.
However, with the attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, the attitude toward the war on drugs gradually changed.
The perceived link and cooperation between the drug trade and the terrorist organisations meant that the threat of narco-terrorism was presented as a global threat and the war on drugs was placed at centre stage, albeit within the context of the war on terror.
The traditional position in the security hierarchy of the fight against drugs versus the fight against terror speaks for the precedence taken by terrorism in constructing a unified one-front policy of the two wars embodied in the fight against narco-terrorism.
Yet, as mentioned above, narcotics and terrorist organisations display significant differences in terms of motivational forces, which result in differences regarding target selection and other operational priorities.
A similar argument can be made for counter-narcotics and counterterrorist agencies. There are certain areas within counter-narcotics, for example, that deal with issues far removed from those of concern in counterterrorism and vice versa, thus leaving certain areas without any connection to narco-terrorism and where cooperation between agencies is less motivated.
There are also activities within counternarcotics measures that can have the effect, at least in the short term, of undermining counter-terrorist efforts. For example, with regard to counternarcotics measures, there is an emphasis on finding viable economic alternatives for the producers or to use pesticides to destroy coca and poppy fields.
This objective for the war on drugs is arguably compatible with the objectives of the war on terror since it could reduce the availability of narcotics and simultaneously reduce finances for terrorist organisations.
However, eradicating or replacing the growing of coca and poppies for illegal use increases the price of the product, in this case cocaine and heroin, thanks to market forces as a diminution of supply is not coupled with any reduction in demand.
This was actually the observed effect after the ban on poppy cultivation set in place by the Taliban in 2000, when the prices of Afghan opium drastically increased in the region. If supply had been further reduced prices were expected to have increased also in Western Europe.
Hence a decreased supply of narcotics, although possibly a partial victory in the war on drugs, could increase the revenue made by terrorist organisations involved in the narcotics trade.
Also, anti-drug measures focus not only on halting the illegal drugs from entering consumer countries or neutralising traffickers on the supply side but see to the demand side as well.
In some consumer countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Canada and Spain, needle-exchange programs have been implemented as a way of preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C within and outside the drug using community, yet this dimension of the narcotics threat has received less attention.
Moreover, a main component of a holistic counter-measure approach towards narcotics trafficking entails conducting information and awareness programs regarding drug abuse to the public.
Even though a zero demand of narcotics would naturally eliminate the possibilities for both terrorist and narcotic traffickers to profit from the drug trade, cooperation has not yet taken place in these areas, nor do they serve as the base for discussion of reasons for a unified policy approach towards narco-terrorism.
In addition, since narcotics pose a chronic problem for a consumer society, the war on drugs again must be fought on home turf in the shape of health care, treatment programs and detoxification clinics in order to reduce the social costs related to victims of drug addiction.
Most importantly, about policy cooperation towards narcoterrorism, the character of the war against drugs differs in many aspects depending on whether it concerns a producing, transit or consumer country, and thus the type of antidrug measures undertaken depend on the dominant aspect of narcotic trafficking in a specific country.
As can be seen from country surveys on the status of narcotics the configuration varies greatly from one country being mainly a consumer country like Great Britain and some having features of the full cycle of the drug trade, like Tajikistan.
About terrorism, to solve existing conflicts involving terrorism and terrorist organisations it may be necessary to include more than law enforcement activities and consider the political motivational factor behind terrorist acts.
Whereas narcotic traffickers’ motivation is mainly economic, the reasons terrorists have for committing criminal acts are extremely varied. Thus, countermeasures must include deep analysis of the contesting parties’ interests, agendas and claims. Resources and commitment must be devoted to building trust and relations, if not for the immediate warring parties, then for the next generation of society to dissuade them from continuing the struggle.
The political issue must, to the greatest extent possible, be solved for the complete eradication of terrorism. This means that resources should be spent on diplomatic relations, foreign aid, in cases where underdevelopment is part of the cause of incompatibility, and governance in assisting the formation of democratic political systems.
These countermeasures do not have a practical place in counter-narcotics policy and represent another area where the anti-drug and anti-terror policies diverge.
