The W.o.D, Moral Panic II
The W.o.D, Counter-Narcotics and -Terrorism
Similarities of Illegal Organisations
In today’s political statements as well as in the media and academic literature, use of the term narco-terrorism implies more than organisations involved in both drug trade and terrorism, it also signals a cooperative link between organised crime and terrorism, and this link is a main reason as to why a coordinated policy approach is advocated. What is less apparent however is the character of the link.
The ambiguous definition of narco-terrorism does not actually imply a partnership between the drug trade organisations and terrorist organisations. It could simply mean the merger of the two phenomena, i.e. drug trafficking and terrorism in one organisation, irrespective of any formalised cooperation between networks.
In the case formalised cooperation does exist, it is difficult to determine to what degree of cooperation is present, nor is the available information overly detailed concerning the precise character of such cooperation.
However, through arrests of illicit narcotics traffickers, law enforcement officials have learnt of interaction between terrorists and persons in the narcotics trade. Arrests also confirm that the interaction is international in nature.
Although, empirical studies of the exact relationship between certain groups are essential to enhance our understanding of the relationship, the purpose of examining similarities and dissimilarities between organisations is to evaluate the policy about narco-terrorism. In this regard, what is most important is that there is a perception that there is interaction and this influences policy.
However, regardless of if formal cooperation exists between certain narcotics and terrorist organisations or not, there are certain similarities in the character of these organisations worth exploring.
Structure and Activities
Both entities, narcotics and terrorist organisations, are criminal in the eyes of international law regardless of if their activities are motivated by politics or economics.
As criminals, terrorists and narcotics traffickers both emphasise secrecy and concealment from law enforcement officials, as this is essential for the survival of the organisations and individual members. Since both are in the same position in this regard, narcotics traffickers and terrorists recognise the need for non-exposure and share the same interest of remaining undiscovered by the authorities.
Moreover, due to the criminal character of their activities, organisations usually are forced to operate in the murkier part of society, thus coming into contact or even sharing a common turf. This also increases the chances of interaction between organisations by pure coexistence.
Also, the structures of narcotic trafficking groups and terrorist organisations are similar. Many of the organisations have internationalised during the past decade and operate transnationally.
#Both organised criminal groups and terrorist organisations generally are characterised by a vertical structure in the upper levels of the organisation, whereas a more horizontal structure is utilised from the mid and lower levels. The use of widespread cells, comprised of few individuals, that run day-to-day operations is common.
The cell-structure also represents a shared concern by both entities to prioritise security, since the use of a cell structure significantly limits the information available to officials in the case of arrests, thus ensuring the survival of the organisation.
In addition to common structures and interests, cooperation between terrorist and narcotics organisations can also be based on the principals of mutual gain.
Largely due to their modus operandi, these organisations require certain types of goods and services, such as weapons, fake passports and ways of laundering money. These kinds of goods and services can be accessed by trading or even sharing resources between organisations.
Dissimilarities
As is indirectly indicated by the concept of narco-terrorism, and illustrated by the crime-terror continuum, the more dominant activity in narco-terrorism can be either narcotics trafficking or terrorism. To further clarify: the phenomenon of narcoterrorism does not represent one category of organisations; rather it includes a great variety of them.
There obviously are significant similarities between these organisations and there also seems to be a substantial amount of convergence points where cooperation could be initiated. However, if one looks beyond the structural make-up of the organisations, means of operation, needs and practical requirements, significant differences also come to light.
Some of these differences are, paradoxically, actually due to their similarities and argue against the possibility of unproblematic interaction and cooperation.
The organisations along the crime-terror continuum are often dependent on the same suppliers, means of transport, infrastructure and source of income.
This condition of requiring the same resources is not a failsafe recipe for cooperation; it can equally lead to competition.
This was evident in Peru when disputes between drug traffickers in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso led to armed clashes in the second half of 1987 and in the numerous reoccurring clashes over land between cartels and terrorist organisations such as the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) [29].
Even the frequently used example of terrorists taxing drug producers for protection, a procedure exemplified by organisations such as al-Qaeda, and highlighted in public addresses as an example of the linkages between drugs and terrorism, is less an example of cooperation than it is an example of a classic patron-client relationship.
Such an exploitative relationship has also commonly led to the killing of terrorist by traffickers refusing to pay ’patriotic taxes’ and vice versa In addition to armed conflict over resources, the two stereotypical types of groups as incorporated in the concept of narco-terrorism, rarely share the same objectives or have the same motivations for their involvement in criminal activity.
Tangible Resources
In the cases in which cooperation does exist, this is because there are gains available to both parties valuable enough to merit collaboration.
For example, the narcotics possessed by narcotics organisations can provide substantial amounts of revenue for a terrorist organisation, whereas a terrorist group’s access to explosives may benefit a narcotic trading organisation.
And resources in demand are in no short supply. The drug production in Afghanistan is blossoming again after a downturn due to the ban set in place by the Taliban in 2000 and the military action against Afghanistan in 2001.
According to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) drug production has now recovered and heroin production in 2003 was estimated at 3600 tones that were grown in over 80,000 hectares, showing a 6% increase in drug production from 2002.
Projections for 2004 indicate an increase of 20–25%. The total monetary quantity of the drug trade is estimated to occupy 1.5–4.5% of the world’s gross product and seizures of tones of narcotics all over the world substantiate the trade to be truly global in character.
How much revenue is generated from the narcotics trade by different criminal or terrorist organisations, is extremely difficult to appreciate.
Not only is information hard to come by due to the criminal nature of the activity and the classification of certain government and intelligence reports, it also depends on where the revenue is gained since prices of narcotics vary immensely depending on the geographical location of where they are sold, in what state of refinement they are purchased, production rates in comparison to market demand, or if revenue is collected on the production or consumer side of the trade or at some point in between.
Yet the total annual number of finances emanating from the narcotics trade is estimated to be between US$500 billion-US$1.5 trillion. Of this total revenue the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Antonio Maria Costa stated in February 2004 that approximately US$2.3 billion end up in the hands of organisations like al-Qaeda.
In addition, weapons, mainly small-scale arms, became more easily available after the dismantling of the Soviet Union and security protocols and physical security of storage facilities deteriorated. As a result, a large quantity of weapons circulated on the illegal market and fell into the hands of clandestine organisations at the end of the Cold War.
Drugs and weapons are of interest to both narcotics organisations and terrorist groups for military and economic purposes thus making the illegal arms and drug market a common area of interest where they would have a strong presence.
Also, the facilitation of access to different goods or the possibility of pure trading of materials can serve as an incentive for increased cooperation between the networks.
Intangible Resources
Intangible resources are a further element about the similarities of these organisations’ need for operability and survival and can thus also serve as an incentive for cooperation and interaction.
For example, narcotic traffickers generally have expert knowledge of methods and routes for illicit transfer of their shipments and transportation of narcotics, information that can be of use to terrorists for the relocation of goods and people.
Narcotics traffickers in turn can tap into the expert knowledge in military tactics, weaponry and skills of explosives that terrorists possess. In 1993, for example, Pablo Escobar, allegedly hired the National Liberation Army (ELN) to construct car bombs, since no one in his organisation possessed this knowledge.
Moreover, knowledge of infrastructure is vital for narcotics and terrorist organisations. Well-used drug routes, such as one of the Balkan routes, from Afghanistan through Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania and from there into Europe through Italy and Greece, are also capable of transporting other illegal goods or people.
In recent years the Balkan route has lost some of its previous importance as the primary transit route of narcotics entering Europe due to the war in former Yugoslavia and to increased border security in Iran.
In its place, the so-called Northern route has gained in prominence, allowing narcotics to move from northern Afghanistan through the Central Asian states, dominantly through Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, passing into the Caucasus and/through Kazakhstan into Russia, the Baltic states and on toward Scandinavia and Europe. The active use of these routes was apparent following 9/11 when terrorists were smuggled out of Afghanistan through Iran,
Central Asia, and Ukraine. Established routes and more newly developed transport ways are equally useful for the purposes of organisations on either end of the crime-terror continuum.
Moreover, illegal organisations need connections, safe houses and corrupt border guards to ensure the security of the routes and such information and contacts can be exchanged or shared. Close cooperation between organisations can also enable them to use and extend each other’s networks and connections with suppliers and outsourced services.
Narcotic trafficking organisations and terrorist groups also require the service of forged documents such as passports, identification papers and custom papers.
These groups also use channels for laundering money such as the hawala system or the black-market peso exchange and could possibly share their connections within such systems.
The extension of networks and contacts, together with the use of each other’s skills and expertise are ways and areas where drug organisations and terrorist organisations could benefit from cooperation, and even if no collaboration exist these resources are still needed and utilised by every organisation on the continuum.
