The War of corruption and Power
Crypto markets
Instead of halting the proliferation of drug markets, the War on Drugs encourages new strategies and mechanisms to avoid detection (Aldridge and Askew, 2017), such as buying and selling drugs through crypto markets on the dark web. These illicit markets exist in hidden layers of the internet that are not accessible through search engines; not only are they potentially harder to detect and target than physical markets, they also offer the advantage of a safer, less risky alternative to dealers and users alike.
Cryptomarkets have become increasingly common over the past decade. In many ways, cryptomarkets do not exhibit the same traits as physical drug markets (Barratt and Aldridge, 2016): they host multiple sellers, often use cryptocurrencies for payment and include feedback and reviews displayed on the marketplace website
in a way that is anonymous for both buyer and seller (Martin, 2018). In theory, cryptomarkets are open because anyone can access them, but in practice many people do not have the technical skills or tools to access and navigate the dark web.
According to Monica Barratt et al. (2016, p. 25) ‘the degree of openness of a market influences the character and extent of violence associated with that market’. The lesser presence of open drug markets does not mean a victory for law enforcement; rather, this is a process of displacement (Kerr et al., 2005), as illustrated by the ‘balloon effect’
Imagine that you are holding a partially inflated balloon in your hand. Squeezing on one side makes some air move to the other side so it becomes more bulbous on that side. The air seems to have disappeared from one part of the balloon, but in fact it has just moved. It is this displacement from one place to another that is known as the ‘balloon effect’.
This balloon effect is cited by some people who are critical of the War on Drugs to describe the illicit drug markets’ response to punitive policies (Mejia and Restrepo, 2013; Reuter, 2014). This is also known as the ‘displacement effect’ (Garzón and Bailey, 2016). As authorities ‘squeeze’ a region of drug production through the crackdown of criminal justice responses, drug producers move to a different geographic region to continue manufacturing drugs elsewhere.
An example of this is what was known as Plan Colombia: an anti- drugs strategy coordinated by the governments of the United States and Colombia from 2000 to 2008. One of the main aims of Plan
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The balloon effect: displacement of drug markets
Colombia was to reduce cocaine production in the country, primarily by spraying herbicides on coca plantations to destroy farmers’ crops. Rather than reducing production, the effect of Plan Colombia was to squeeze cocaine producers out of Colombia into Central America and Mexico (Mejia, 2016).
In addition, local farmers’ crops were destroyed by the herbicide, eradicating many people’s main source of income, thereby perpetuating conditions of poverty (Guardiola-Rivera and Koram, 2019).
Although the concept is contested by some academics (Windle and Farrell, 2012), the balloon effect is a useful metaphor for understanding the process of displacement of drug markets.
Anonymity and trust have a role to play in the making of safer retail markets online, increasing their appeal to customers and sellers. The most recent UN World Drug Report found that ‘drug trafficking groups operating over the darknet are not in a position to effectively enforce drug deals by threatening their counterparts with violence’ (UNODC, 2019, p. 52). The safety of the anonymous cryptomarket spans the lack of physical violence to the quality control mechanisms triggered by peer-reviewing practices (Martin, 2018).
These developments have been possible because of technological change and the primacy of the internet. A brief summary of the history of drug markets would document a shift away from the prevalence of open drug markets through to closed or hidden markets. The targeting of open markets by law enforcement made them less appealing to both sellers and customers, and development of mobile phones and the internet has made open markets increasingly redundant (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2017).
Crypto markets for drugs emerged as a result of the War on Drugs targeting open physical markets, in conjunction with the development of global technology and interconnectivity. The development of crypto markets highlights how the punitive approach elicited by prohibition is not effective in reducing drugs markets, but instead encourages inventive ways for markets to flourish
Has the War on Drugs been won? Has the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs ceased, or at least decreased, since this ‘war’ began? The latest UNODC World Drugs Report shows that overall, seizures of illicit drugs are increasing globally (UNODC, 2019). Can this count as a win? Or does this highlight an increase in drug trafficking and drug use?
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Human rights the human rights of people who use drugs are continuously undermined through incarceration, killing, stigma, discrimination.
Trafficking and organised crime Drugs are a central source of income and development for organised criminal networks
Green crime Unregulated production of drugs results in pollution and deforestation – for example, aerial spraying of poisonous chemicals over illicit coca crops threatens fauna, flora, and human health, while deforestation and pollution is a consequence of hiding cocaine ‘labs’ and finding spaces to grow coca.
Law enforcement Global expenditure is difficult to estimate, but we know it far exceeds health expenditure, and is both expensive and ineffective.
The unequal distribution of consequences
The consequences of the War on Drugs are not evenly distributed. Both globally and locally, negative consequences are experienced more harshly by certain socioeconomic and cultural groups. White, affluent, consumers in the Global North are less likely to be negatively affected by the War on Drugs than poor, black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) people living in the Global North and in producer or transit countries in the Global South.
For example, in England and Wales in 2016 and 2017, ‘Black people were stopped and searched for drugs at almost nine times the rate of white people, while Asian people and those in the “mixed” group were stop-searched for drugs at almost three times the rate of white people’ (Shiner et al., 2019, p. vi).
If you look at global imprisonment data (despite the lack of accurate and exhaustive figures due to poor recording practices in many countries) clear trends emerge:
. A high number of people are incarcerated for minor drug-related offences. A study estimated this to amount to more than 8 out of 10, or over 80 per cent, of all global drug-related offences (UNODC, 2013).
BAME people are more likely to be targeted and incarcerated for drug offences, and more likely to receive harsh punishment in the form of longer sentences, in every Anglophone country.
Not only are women more likely to be incarcerated for drug offences than men, but these rates can be high. One study estimated that 28 per cent of all women in prison in Europe and Central Asia were imprisoned for drug offences, and the proportion in specific countries, like Thailand, is much higher, with an estimated 57 per cent (Penal Reform International, 2015, p. 12).
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Alternatives to the War on Drugs
Some states have re-evaluated their stance on drug control and have opted for alternatives. These deviations from a total War on Drugs have happened as a result of the harms that prohibitionist policies have caused. Some countries have interpreted UN conventions differently, or they have gone against them, even though they are signatories.
This means that some states have signed the official UN convention documents agreeing to try to reduce drug production, trafficking and use through a punitive framework but have then decided to take a different approach. Over time, even the UN has adopted a less hard- line approach in its implementation of the War on Drugs, in part because of the increasing evidence of harms caused by it
(Jelsma, 2016). Some countries’ policies outwardly focus on harm reduction and a public health approach by decriminalising possession of drugs (Portugal, for example). In other countries, however, (Canada, Uruguay, and multiple states in the United States including Colorado and California) they have opted to legalise and regulate cannabis markets for recreational and medicinal use (Room, 2014; Pardo, 2014; Windle et al., 2019).
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As you have seen, one consequence of the War on Drugs is more enforcement of punitive approaches worldwide, without evidence that shows a decrease in drug production, trafficking or use. It is difficult to measure how the war would be ‘won’, and indeed the consequences of sustaining the War on Drugs have produced a variety of harms. Not only is the war being lost, it has also perpetuated forms of structural violence.
Structural violence was first conceptualised by Johan Galtung in 1969 and developed in his later work. Here, violence is defined as ‘avoidable insults to basic human needs’, which include survival, wellbeing, identity and freedom (Galtung, 1990, p. 292).
In Galtung’s general typology of violence, direct forms of violence (for example, killing) are combined with forms of structural violence, which include but are not limited to exploitation, repression, detention, expulsion, marginalisation and fragmentation.
In its ‘Count the Cost’ campaign, the non-governmental advocacy organisation Transform Drug Policy Foundation (TDPF) posits that the War on Drugs: ‘undermines international development and security, and fuels conflict; threatens public health, spreads disease and causes death; undermines human rights; promotes stigma and discrimination; creates crime and enriches criminals; causes deforestation and pollution; wastes billions on ineffective law enforcement’ (TDPF, 2019, p. 1).
By breaking down TDPF’s statement both the direct and unintended consequences of the War on Drugs are seen:
Security and stability Drug-related or drug-money-fuelled conflicts and ensuing instability have taken place in many countries including Mexico, Colombia, Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau.
Public health Drug-related deaths and disease are widespread. The global burden of disease is affected by unsafe practices of drug use which are in turn affected by drugs’ illicit status.
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These sobering estimates demonstrate that, given the War on Drugs’ racist and puritan underpinnings, the consequences are experienced most heavily by people from disadvantaged groups. When the axes of inequality intersect, the likelihood of an individual experiencing negative consequences is greater.
For example, being a woman who is poor and involved with low-level drug trafficking in the Global South will increase the likelihood of experiencing structural violence through stigma, discrimination, exclusion, criminalisation, disease, incarceration and disproportionate punishment (Fleetwood, 2011; Urquiza- Hass, 2017).
The consequences of the War on Drugs are not just unequally distributed within countries, but also between countries. For example, although the United States is the largest consumer of illicit substances in the Americas, some of the harshest consequences of this are felt more acutely in producing and neighbouring countries.
Given the gravity of harmful consequences in central and South America, it was three South American presidents, Cardoso of Brazil (1995–2002), Gaviria of Colombia (1990–1994) and Zedillo of Mexico (1994–2000), who after leaving office, publicly acknowledged the failure of the War on Drugs and began advocating for drug policy reform (Alimi, 2015).
They have become key actors in the establishment of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, an organisation of political leaders and experts that advocates for extensive drug policy reform.
It is important to note that calls for drug policy reform originated from the realisation that the War on Drugs itself caused many harms and failures. The next section will briefly outline some policy alternatives to the War on Drugs.
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Legalisation
Making a drug legal, meaning it is not a criminal offence to use, possess or sell the drug, can take a variety of forms. A legal drug can be freely available to consumers without restriction, such as coffee. Alternatively, a legal drug can be regulated for purchase based on varying restrictions such as age, as is the case for alcohol in most countries, or for medical use or research, like many prescription medications.
Uruguay, Canada and some states in the United States have legalised the recreational use of cannabis, with each country taking a different policy approach to implementing legalisation.
The long-term implications of cannabis legalisation and regulation are not yet known, as the earliest reform happened as recently as 2012. However, parallels can be drawn with the pharmaceutical industry and other regulated products such as tobacco and alcohol.
It is worth noting that Colorado in the United States was the first state in the world to legalise cannabis in 2012 (arguably medical cannabis, legalised there in 2000, is a slightly different discussion). This leads to the question: to what extent have we broken free of global US dominance in drug policy?
This is significant, as it was only after Colorado legalised cannabis that a domino-effect began, with other states and countries following suit (Room, 2014). This could be interpreted to mean the continuing dominance of the United States in global drug policy.
